plamentsv / pda-security

Name: plamentsv/pda-security
Author: plamentsv

Trigger Pattern PDA flag detected (seeds/bump/find_program_address usage) - Inject Into Breadth agents, depth agents

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SKILL.md

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PDA_SECURITY Skill

Trigger Pattern: PDA flag detected (seeds/bump/findprogramaddress usage)
Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth agents
Finding prefix: [PDA-N]
Rules referenced: S2, S1

For every PDA in the Solana program:

1. PDA Seed Inventory

List all PDA seed declarations:

#	PDA Name	Seeds	Purpose	Anchor Constraint	Location
1	{name}	`[b"prefix", user.key().as_ref(), &[bump]]`	{what it stores}	`seeds = [...], bump`	{file:line}

2. Canonical Bump Enforcement

For each PDA:

PDA	Bump Source	Canonical?	Risk if Non-Canonical
{name}	Anchor auto (`bump`) / `find_program_address` / USER INPUT	YES/NO	{if NO: multiple valid addresses}

Attack (S2): If bump is user-supplied, attacker can use a non-canonical bump to derive a DIFFERENT address that still passes create_program_address. This creates a separate PDA from the intended one.
Defense: Always use find_program_address (returns canonical bump) or Anchor's bump constraint.

3. Seed Collision Analysis

For each PAIR of PDA seed schemas:

PDA A Seeds	PDA B Seeds	Can Byte Sequences Overlap?	Collision Risk?
`[b"vault", mint.as_ref()]`	`[b"vaultm", ...]`	CHECK: "vault" + mintbytes could equal "vaultm" + otherbytes?	YES/NO

Attack: Two different PDA types with seeds that can produce identical byte sequences → one PDA masquerades as another.
Defense: Use unique fixed-length prefixes (e.g., b"vault\x00") or ensure seed structures cannot collide.

4. Seed Uniqueness

For each PDA type, verify seeds include sufficient uniqueness:

PDA	Unique Per	Seeds Include User/Entity Key?	Could Two Users Share PDA?
{name}	User / Mint / Pool / Global	YES/NO	{if YES: shared state corruption}

Pattern: User-specific PDAs MUST include the user's pubkey in seeds. Omitting it means all users share the same PDA.

5. PDA Isolation

For each PDA used as an authority or signer:

PDA	Signs For	Isolated to Scope?	Can Different Instruction Misuse?
{name}	{what operations}	YES/NO	{if NO: cross-instruction authority sharing}

Attack: A PDA authority used across multiple instructions where one instruction has weaker validation → attacker uses the weak path.

6. PDA Sharing Detection

Check if multiple account types share the same PDA seed schema:

Seed Schema	Account Types Using It	Type Confusion Risk?
`[b"data", key.as_ref()]`	{list all account types}	{if >1: type confusion possible}

7. Initialization Front-Running

For each PDA created with init:

PDA	Created By	Front-Runnable?	Impact if Front-Run
{name}	{instruction}	YES/NO	{attacker initializes with malicious data}

Attack (S2): Attacker front-runs PDA initialization, creating the account with attacker-controlled data before the legitimate initialization transaction.
Defense: init (not init_if_needed) + seeds that include the authorized initializer's pubkey.
Warning: init_if_needed is explicitly dangerous - it silently succeeds if account already exists with potentially malicious data.

Finding Template

**ID**: [PDA-N]
**Severity**: [based on impact: seed collision = Critical, non-canonical bump = High]
**Step Execution**: ✓1,2,3,4,5,6,7 | ✗(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [S2:✓, S1:✓]
**Location**: program/src/{file}.rs:LineN
**Title**: [PDA issue type] in [context] enables [attack]
**Description**: [Specific PDA vulnerability with seed analysis]
**Impact**: [Fund theft via PDA confusion / state corruption / front-running]

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

Section	Required	Completed?	Notes
1. PDA Seed Inventory	YES	✓/✗/?	For every PDA
2. Canonical Bump Enforcement	YES	✓/✗/?	For every PDA
3. Seed Collision Analysis	YES	✓/✗/?	For every PDA pair
4. Seed Uniqueness	YES	✓/✗/?	User-specific PDAs
5. PDA Isolation	IF PDA used as authority	✓/✗(N/A)/?	Cross-instruction misuse
6. PDA Sharing Detection	YES	✓/✗/?	Type confusion
7. Initialization Front-Running	IF init used	✓/✗(N/A)/?	initifneeded is dangerous