dragonked2 / token-security
Token analysis — mint/burn authority, permit, fee-on-transfer, rebasing, hooks, upgradeability. Load for any token, especially ones used as collateral, vault assets, or bridge assets.
TOKEN SECURITY
Authority map (answer first)
Who can mint? Who can burn whose tokens? Who can pause/blacklist/seize?
Is there an arbitrary-mint path (unrestricted mint, broken access
control, initializer)? Can supply be manipulated (rebasing, reflection,
unbounded mint)? A token with attacker-influenced supply poisons every
protocol that prices it as collateral.
Behavioral quirks vs the host protocol
- Fee-on-transfer: host accounting assuming exact amounts breaks.
Rebasing/reflection: balances change without transfers; debt and share
math desync.Hooks/callbacks (ERC777, ERC1363, safe-transfer to contracts): re-entry
with stale accounting.Permit (EIP-2612): signature replay across chains/forks if domain
separator omits chainid/address; nonce handling; front-runnable approvals.Blacklist/pause/upgrade: censoring withdrawals, freezing collateral,
or changing semantics under a live market.
Grep anchors
grep -rn "function mint\|function burn\|_mint(\|_burn(\|permit(\|DOMAIN_SEPARATOR\|feeOnTransfer\|_beforeTokenTransfer\|_afterTokenTransfer" contracts/Rule
Token quirks are only findings when they produce host-protocol loss:
show the downstream invariant break (collateral overvalued, shares
mispriced, bridge over-minted). Quirks in isolation are informational.